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Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch recently 
proposed a radical shrinking of federal habeas corpus relief for state 
prisoners who are in custody pursuant to a final judgment of criminal 
conviction.  They called for a return to the supposedly traditional principle 
that federal courts cannot grant habeas relief to such prisoners unless the 
state court that sentenced them lacked jurisdiction.  This Article explains 
that (1) this supposedly traditional principle was not, in fact, a traditional 
principle of habeas, and (2) even if it were, Congress has displaced it by 
statute.  Exploring the errors in the Justices’ arguments provides valuable 
lessons in the proper uses of historical materials and in the hermeneutics 
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Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch recently 
issued opinions that should have alarm bells clanging loudly throughout 
the criminal defense bar.
1
  They argued for a dramatic reduction in the 
availability of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners.  Their views could 
make federal habeas corpus relief less available for state prisoners than it 
has ever been since Congress first authorized it in 1867.
2
   
 Habeas corpus, the “Great Writ”
3
 is the ancient legal device used to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention.
4
  Today, it is most commonly 
sought by state prisoners who are serving their sentence after being 
                                                 
*
 Professor of Law and F. Elwood and Eleanor Davis Research Professor of Law, George 
Washington University Law School.   
1
 See Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1562 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 
1566 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
2
 See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. 
3
 Chief Justice Marshall referred to habeas corpus as the “great writ” in Ex parte 
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807), and that soubriquet has become common, 
usually capitalized. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 142 (1970).  Blackstone called habeas “the 
most celebrated writ in the English law.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries 129. 
4
 E.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, HABEAS CORPUS 1 (2d ed. 2010).  The history of habeas 
corpus goes back as far as the thirteenth century, although its use as a device to test the 
lawfulness of detention emerged only gradually during the fifteenth to seventeenth 
centuries.  R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 1-19 (1976). 
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convicted of a crime in state court.
5
  Under current law, a federal court 
(subject to various constraints) may grant habeas relief for such a prisoner 
if the state court proceedings leading to the prisoner’s conviction or 
sentence clearly violated the prisoner’s federal constitutional rights.
6
  
When a federal court issues habeas relief in such a case, the state must 
release or, if appropriate, retry or resentence the prisoner.
7
 
 Although the Supreme Court has in the past approved habeas relief for 
such prisoners on the basis of any prejudicial, constitutional error in their 
state criminal proceedings,
8
 the Court has, for several decades now, been 
tightening the availability of habeas for such prisoners. Some of this 
tightening has resulted from the Court’s interpretation of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), by which Congress 
amended the habeas statute,
9
 and some from the Court’s own doctrinal 
development.  Either way, federal habeas relief is much harder for state 
prisoners to obtain in 2021 than it was in 1971.   
The Court’s recent decision in Edwards v. Vannoy,
10
 which continued 
this process of tightening, was therefore no surprise.  Indeed, the decision, 
while theoretically significant, will likely make little practical difference.  
The decision formally closed off a potential basis for habeas relief, but no 
one had ever actually succeeded in convincing the Supreme Court to 
approve habeas on that basis anyway.
11
 
 Potentially much more significant than the majority opinion in Vannoy 
were the concurring opinions by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch.  
These opinions agreed with the limitation on habeas imposed by the Court, 
but suggested that the concurring Justices were prepared to go much 
further.  The concurring opinions asserted that habeas corpus traditionally 
provided no relief to a prisoner held pursuant to a judgment of criminal 
conviction issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
12
  The concurring 
                                                 
5
 JONATHAN R. SIEGEL, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 976 (2d ed. 2019); 
YACKLE, supra note 4, at 84. 
6
 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding that habeas relief may issue if the 
state court that sentenced the prisoner violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights); 
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 421 (2013) (“In general, if a convicted state criminal 
defendant can show a federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the 
Federal Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus that requires a new trial, 
a new sentence, or release.”); (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding 
that habeas relief may be granted only for clear violation of constitutional rights). 
7
 Release would be mandatory if the prisoner was convicted for conduct that cannot 
constitutionally be criminalized at all.  If the constitutional error in the state proceedings 
was only procedural, retrial would be appropriate.  In practice, retrial is far more common 
than release.  Resentencing would be appropriate if constitutional error affected the 
prisoner’s sentence but not the underlying conviction. 
8
 E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1973). 
9
 Pub. L. 104-132 (1996). 
10
 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021). 
11
 See Part I.C.1, infra. 
12
 141 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1573 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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Justices indicated that they would be guided in future cases by this 
purportedly traditional rule.
13
   
 Thus, according to these Justices, when a state prisoner who is serving 
a criminal sentence seeks habeas relief from a federal court, that court 
should inquire only whether the state court that sentenced the prisoner had 
jurisdiction to do so.  If the answer is yes, the federal court should deny 
habeas relief, regardless of whether the state court’s proceedings violated 
any of the prisoner’s federal constitutional rights.  Under this rule, it 
wouldn’t matter if the state court that tried the prisoner’s original criminal 
case violated the prisoner’s right to a jury trial,
14
 to the assistance of 
counsel,
15
 to call witnesses,
16
 to avoid self-incrimination,
17
 or any of the 
numerous other federal constitutional rights that apply in state criminal 
proceedings.  No matter how clear or how prejudicial these violations 
might have been, the federal court would be powerless to grant habeas 
relief, provided the state court that committed these constitutional errors 
had jurisdiction. 
 These concurring opinions require urgent attention.  If the Supreme 
Court were to adopt what these concurrences assert to be the traditional 
rule, habeas would be drastically changed.  Seeking freedom for state 
prisoners held pursuant to judgments of criminal conviction is the main 
use of habeas in federal court today.
18
  Under the rule proposed by Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch, this use of habeas would be all but abolished.     
 Even though the views expressed in the concurrences are so different 
from current law that adopting them would amount to a revolution, it 
would be foolish to discount the possibility that the law might take such a 
revolutionary turn.  Personnel changes at the Supreme Court have 
transformed Justice Thomas from a lonely voice suggesting results far 
from the legal mainstream into a vital trendsetter.  His once-idiosyncratic 
views on matters such as nondelegation doctrine
19
 and judicial deference 
to legal interpretations by administrative agencies
20
 are on the verge of 
                                                 
13
 Id. at 1573 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Each of the two Justices joined the other’s 
concurring opinion. 
14




 Id.  Indeed, not only does the Sixth Amendment guarantee the right of a criminal 
defendant to call witnesses, it guarantees that the defendant shall have the use of 
compulsory process to do so.  Id. 
17
 U.S. Const., amend. V.  The cited provisions of the Fifth and Sixth amendments as well 
as numerous other constitutional protections for criminal defendants apply in state 
criminal proceedings by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). 
18
 See note 5, supra. 
19
 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“On a future day . . . I would be willing to address the question whether our 
delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of 
separation of powers.”).  
20
 See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“the 
judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent 
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.”). 
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becoming law.
21
  Close, critical attention to the arguments of Justice 
Thomas and Justice Gorsuch is essential.
22
 
 This Article provides such attention.  It brings out two fundamental 
flaws in the Justices’ arguments.  As noted, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch 
suggest that traditionally, a habeas court would not issue relief for a 
prisoner held pursuant to a judgment of criminal conviction unless the 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction.  They also assert that modern federal 
courts should follow this purportedly traditional rule.  The two fatal flaws 
in these arguments are that (1) the rule that Justices Thomas and Gorsuch 
say was the traditional rule was not, in fact, the traditional rule, and (2) 
even if it were, Congress has displaced the rule by statute. 
On the first point, the error in Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch’s 
position lies in their insufficiently sensitive approach to using historical 
materials.  Exploration of their error provides a valuable lesson in  using 
such materials properly.  Justice Gorsuch, particularly, relies on quotations 
from early cases without fully acknowledging the meaning that they had in 
their original context.  He incorrectly ascribes to these quotations the 
meaning they might have if a court wrote them today.  One must, 
however, always remember that “the past is a foreign country; they do 
things differently there.”
23
  Historical statements must be understood in 
their original context. 
Justice Gorsuch is correct that numerous early federal cases state that a 
federal court may grant habeas relief to a prisoner detained pursuant to a 
judgment of conviction only if the court issuing that judgment lacked 
jurisdiction.  However, these statements cannot be wrenched from their 
context and taken to mean what they would mean if written today.  These 
statements use the term “jurisdiction” in a special sense quite different 
from the usual meaning of the term.   
When a nineteenth-century habeas court said that it could examine 
only whether a sentencing court had jurisdiction, it did not really mean 
that.  Habeas courts did not traditionally limit themselves to issuing relief 
in cases where the sentencing court lacked what one would today call 
“jurisdiction”—cases in which, say, a probate court erroneously 
                                                 
21
 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); 
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2437-38 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  In Gundy, 
Justice Gorsuch, in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, said that 
he “would not wait” to revisit nondelegation doctrine and noted that Justice Alito’s 
opinion indicated a willingness to revisit the doctrine in a future case.  In Kisor, Justice 
Gorsuch, in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh, 
said that a doctrine of judicial deference “sits uneasily with the Constitution” and that the 
judicial power to interpret the law cannot be shared with the other branches. 
22
 This attention is all the more necessary because the Justices’ proposal for a radical 
change in habeas corpus came without briefing, as no party asked that habeas be 
restricted in the way proposed in the concurring opinions.  Richard M. Re, Reason and 
Rhetoric in Edwards v. Vannoy, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3865178, at 9.  
23
 L. P. HARTLEY, THE GO BETWEEN 9 (1953). 
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entertained a murder prosecution.
24
  In fact, habeas courts might determine 
that the sentencing court lacked “jurisdiction” if the law under which the 
defendant was sentenced was unconstitutional, if the sentence violated the 
rule against double jeopardy, or if the sentencing court committed certain 
procedural errors in a proceeding under a valid law.
25
   
Thus, the statement that a federal habeas court would not traditionally 
provide relief to someone held pursuant to a judgment of criminal 
conviction unless the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction, while not 
exactly false, is highly misleading.  This statement is true only if the term 
“jurisdiction” is understood in its original, historical context, where it was 
used as a technical term of art with a special meaning quite different from 
its usual meaning.  It would be much more informative to say that 
traditionally a habeas court would provide relief to someone held pursuant 
to a judgment of criminal conviction if the sentencing court committed an 
important error of a kind that habeas courts were willing to correct.
26
 
 In addition, even if it were true that habeas relief was traditionally not 
available to prisoners held pursuant to a judgment of criminal conviction 
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, Congress has statutorily 
changed that rule.  As to this point, exploration of Justice Thomas and 
Justice Gorsuch’s position provides a useful lesson in the hermeneutics of 
statutory interpretation.  The lesson is that when interpreting a statutory 
text, one must consider not only what is expressly stated in the text but 
what is necessarily implied.  As amended by AEDPA, the federal habeas 
statute plainly assumes and confirms the availability of habeas relief in 
cases beyond the limits of the supposed traditional rule.
27
 
 Thus, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch are doubly mistaken to suggest 
that federal habeas courts should return to applying a traditional rule that 
requires them to deny relief to any prisoner held pursuant to a judgment of 
criminal conviction issued by a sentencing court that had proper 
jurisdiction.  That rule was not the traditional rule, and even if it were, 
Congress has changed the rule by statute. 
 Part I of this Article provides some background on the use of federal 
habeas corpus by state prisoners held pursuant to judgments of criminal 
conviction.  Part II explores the “traditional rule” for such habeas cases 
and shows that federal courts traditionally issued habeas relief in cases not 
involving lack of jurisdiction.  Part III explores the statutes Congress has 
                                                 
24
 Cf., e.g., Wedmore v. State, 233 Ind. 545 (1954) (vacating a judgment of conviction for 
assault and battery entered by a state probate court because that court did not have 
jurisdiction over that kind of criminal case). 
25
 See Part II.B, infra. 
26
 See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2.4[d] at 45-46 (2011) (stating that “nationally important claims” were 
traditionally cognizable in habeas and that “[a]t no time was the line between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims a good proxy for the line between important 
and unimportant claims”). 
27
 See Part III.B, infra. 
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passed regarding habeas and their implications for the availability of 
federal habeas relief for state prisoners. 
 
I.  Modeling Habeas Corpus  
 
 To appreciate the radical nature of the change that Justices Thomas 
and Gorsuch propose, one must first understand the model of habeas 
corpus as it exists today.  As this Part explains, the Supreme Court 
currently understands habeas using what might be termed a “constrained 
certiorari substitute” model.
28
  Under this model, a federal court 
considering a habeas petition from a state prisoner who is in custody 
pursuant to a state court judgment of criminal conviction may, subject to 
various constraints, issue habeas relief if the Supreme Court could have 
vacated the prisoner’s conviction or sentence had it granted a petition for a 
writ of certiorari from the prisoner while the prisoner’s case was on direct 
review.
29
  The crucial characteristic of this model is that it treats habeas as 
“exempt from preclusion.”
30
  The federal court considering the habeas 
petition may reconsider and come to a different ruling on a question 
already decided by the state courts in the prisoner’s underlying criminal 
case. 
 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch propose a very different model.  Under 
their model, habeas would bow to preclusion.  A prisoner in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a state court in a criminal case could not use 
habeas to challenge the correctness of the state court’s decision.  The 
prisoner could challenge only whether the state court had jurisdiction. 
 
A.  Terminology and Assumptions 
Before discussing these competing models of habeas corpus, it will be 
convenient to establish some terminology and assumptions:  
The term “habeas” will often be used as an abbreviation for “habeas 
corpus.”
31
  A person in custody seeking habeas relief will usually be 
referred to as “the prisoner.”  The court in which a prisoner is seeking 
habeas will often be referred to as “the habeas court,” and the court that 
issued the criminal sentence pursuant to which the prisoner is confined 
will often be referred to as “the sentencing court.”   
                                                 
28
 See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 26, at § 2.4 (2011) (characterizing habeas as “[a] 
surrogate for Supreme Court review as of right”). 
29
 See id. (noting “the parity that has long existed in this country between direct Supreme 
Court and habeas corpus review of state prisoners’ constitutional attacks on their 
convictions and sentences”). 
30
 Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 
401 (1996); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 444, 463 (1963). 
31
 Strictly speaking, “habeas corpus” is itself an abbreviation for habeas corpus ad 
satisfaceindum, the full name of the writ that challenges detention, which distinguishes it 
from other forms of the writ of habeas corpus that serve other functions. 
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It will be assumed in most places throughout the Article that the 
prisoner seeking habeas relief is a state prisoner who is in custody 
pursuant to a judgment of criminal conviction issued by a state court.
32
  
This assumption will occasionally be spelled out or alluded to, and the 
application of habeas to other kinds of prisoners will also be discussed, but 
to avoid tedious repetition, whenever the term “prisoner” is used without 
qualification, it should be understood, unless the context indicates 
otherwise, to mean “prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a 
judgment of criminal conviction issued by a state court.” 
 It will also be assumed that the prisoner is seeking habeas relief from a 
federal district court and that the prisoner has satisfied the technical 
prerequisites for federal habeas relief.  Thus, it will be assumed that the 
prisoner is in custody,
33
 that the prisoner has exhausted available state 
remedies,
34
 that the prisoner has applied for federal habeas relief within 
the applicable statute of limitations,
35
 and that the prisoner has not 




B.  The Current Model: Habeas as Constrained Certiorari Substitute 
Under the current model of habeas corpus, the writ serves prisoners as 
a constrained substitute for review by the Supreme Court via a writ of 
certiorari.  The model’s starting point is that the habeas court may grant 
relief whenever the Supreme Court might have vacated the sentencing 
court’s decision in the prisoner’s case on direct review via certiorari.  This 
basic concept is, however, qualified by several constraints. 
The habeas statute provides that writs of habeas corpus “may be 
granted” by federal courts and judges “within their respective 
jurisdictions.”
37
 It also provides, however, that federal courts and judges 
shall entertain an application for the writ on behalf of a prisoner in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a state court “only on the ground that he is in 
                                                 
32
 The writ of habeas corpus may be sought in numerous other situations: for example, by 
a prisoner held by the executive authority of a state government or the federal 
government without judicial involvement, by someone involuntarily confined for medical 
reasons (such as a quarantine or a mental health problem), or by someone involuntarily 
conscripted into the armed forces. 
33
 A state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief only if the prisoner is in custody.  28 
U.S.C. §§ 2241(c); 2254(a).  This restriction primarily affects prisoners convicted of 
minor crimes who serve their entire sentence before they have an opportunity to seek 
habeas relief. 
34
 The habeas statute requires a state prisoner to exhaust state remedies before seeking 
federal habeas relief.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). 
35
 The habeas statute limits the time within which a state prisoner may seek federal 
habeas relief to one year, usually measured from the date on which the U.S. Supreme 
Court denies the prisoner’s petition for certiorari (or the time for the prisoner to seek 
certiorari expires), with an exclusion for time during which the prisoner is seeking review 
in state post-conviction or collateral proceedings.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).  Certain capital 
cases are subject to a shorter limitation period.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2263. 
36
 The habeas statute, with very limited exceptions, limits a prisoner to filing only one 
federal habeas petition.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 
37
 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). 
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custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.”
38
  The habeas statute therefore poses the question of what it means 
for a prisoner to be in custody “in violation of the Constitution.” 
Under current law (with qualifications described below), this 
requirement is satisfied if the state proceedings that led to the prisoner’s 
conviction or sentence involved a prejudicial violation of the prisoner’s 
federal constitutional rights.
39
  The constitutional rights may be 
substantive or procedural.
40
  Either way, the basic principle, subject to 
qualifications described below, is that the prisoner may obtain habeas 
relief whenever the U.S. Supreme Court might have vacated the prisoner’s 
conviction on direct review.   
 Critically important to this model is that habeas is “exempt from 
preclusion.”
41
  The availability of habeas relief is obviously in tension 
with ordinary principles of preclusion doctrine.  Normally, if a party to a 
case in state court does not like the result, the party’s remedy is to appeal 
within the state court system.  If the party exhausts all available state 
appeals and still does not like the result, the party may request that the 
U.S. Supreme Court review any federal issues in the case via a writ of 
certiorari.
42
  But if the Supreme Court denies certiorari, the party normally 
has no further avenue for relief.   
Certainly, in a civil case, such a party could not get a federal district 
court to issue a writ that would somehow negate the state court’s 
judgment, even if the party claimed—indeed, even if the district court 
agreed—that the state court proceedings violated the party’s federal 
constitutional rights.
43
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal 
district courts from reviewing judgments of state courts.
44
  Even if there 
were no special doctrine to cover the situation, ordinary principles of 
                                                 
38
 Id. § 2254(a); see also id. § 2241(c)(3). 
39
 Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 421 (2013) (“In general, if a convicted state criminal 
defendant can show a federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the 
Federal Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus that requires a new trial, 
a new sentence, or release.”).  The habeas statute also permits the writ to be granted in 
cases in which the prisoner is in custody in violation of “laws or treaties” of the United 
States, but there are very few federal statutes or treaties that regulate state criminal 
proceedings.  Therefore, in practice, an application for habeas from a state prisoner held 
pursuant to a judgment of conviction almost invariably involves a federal constitutional 
claim. 
40
 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1973). 
41
 Yackle, supra note 30, at 401. 
42
 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 
43
 State proceedings in civil cases might violate a party’s constitutional rights.  For 
example, the state court might have proceeded even though it lacked personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); the 
selection of the jury (in a case tried by jury) might have violated the Equal Protection 
Clause; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); or a judge might have 
participated in the case despite a constitutional duty to recuse himself, Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
44
 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
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preclusion would require the district court to give preclusive effect to the 
state court’s judgment against the party.
45
 
 State court judgments in criminal cases, however, are treated 
differently.  A prisoner in custody after being convicted in a criminal case 
in state court is allowed to ask a federal district court to issue a writ that 
effectively nullifies the state court’s judgment.
46
  The federal district court 
may reconsider and come to a different result on federal constitutional 
issues already considered by the state courts.
47
  This result follows partly 
from the habeas statute’s provision that a federal court may grant habeas 
relief to a prisoner who is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States,”
48
 which the Supreme Court has long 
understood to empower federal courts to grant habeas without regard to 
preclusion.
49
  It is also supported by two key policy considerations:  first, 
that habeas concerns human liberty, the uniquely powerful interest in 
which justifies the application of different preclusion rules than those that 
apply when only monetary interests are at stake,
50
 and second, the fact that 
only a habeas petition provides a state prisoner with an opportunity, as of 




                                                 
45
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 
(1984) (“a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as 
would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was 
rendered”) 
46
 The Supreme Court has observed that issuing habeas relief does not, technically, alter 
the judgment of the state court pursuant to which the prisoner is in custody; it simply 
orders the prisoner released.  Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-32 (1963).  But this is 
sophistry.  Habeas relief may not, as a technical matter, alter the state court’s judgment of 
conviction, but it has the effect of nullifying that judgment. 
47
 Yackle, supra note 41, at 401. 
48
 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also id. § 2241(a), (c)(3). 
49
 Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886) (“[W]hile it might appear unseemly that a 
prisoner, after conviction in a state court, should be set at liberty by a single judge on 
habeas corpus, there [is] no escape from the act of 1867.”). 
50
 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (“Conventional notions of finality of 
litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional 
rights is alleged.”).  Even the Supreme Court’s more recent cases, which tighten the 
availability of habeas and give more weight to the value of finality, recognize that finality 
gets less weight in criminal than in civil cases.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (“The fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions 
“shows only that ‘conventional notions of finality’ should not have as much place in 
criminal as in civil litigation, not that they should have none.”) (quoting Henry J. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 142, 150 (1970)). 
51
 State prisoners can, and indeed normally must, put forward any constitutional claims 
they may have in the state proceedings leading to their conviction, but in those 
proceedings state judges will rule on the claims, and state judges, who lack the life tenure 
and salary protection guaranteed to federal judges under Article III of the Constitution, 
may fear to provide robust enforcement of politically unpopular protections for criminal 
defendants.  See Yackle, supra note 4, at 88-93. State prisoners may also seek U.S. 
Supreme Court review of their claims by petitioning for certiorari when their cases are on 
direct review, but review by certiorari is discretionary, see Supreme Court Rule 10, and 
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Habeas relief is not, however, currently available in every case in 
which the prisoner might have obtained relief from the Supreme Court on 
direct review. Ever since the end of the Warren Court in 1969, the 
Supreme Court has gradually tightened the availability of habeas, 
subjecting it to numerous constraints.  Three constraints are of particular 
importance.  First, while habeas relief, as a general rule, may be based on 
any federal constitutional defect in the state criminal proceedings that 
resulted in the prisoner’s confinement (provided the defect was 
prejudicial),
52
 a claim that evidence was introduced in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is not cognizable on habeas and 
may not be the basis for habeas relief.
53
  Second, in determining whether a 
state prisoner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution,” a federal 
habeas court must apply the constitutional law of criminal procedure as it 
existed on the date that the prisoner’s state conviction became final on 
direct review; the prisoner is not entitled to the benefit of new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure announced only after that date.
54
  
Finally, and most important, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(d) 
of the habeas statute to prohibit a federal court from granting habeas relief 
unless the sentencing court’s decision on a point of federal law was not 
only wrong, but unreasonably wrong.
55
  That is, the habeas court must 
apply a principle of deference that is similar to the Chevron deference that 
a federal court must give to a federal administrative agency’s 
interpretation of a statute that Congress has entrusted it to administer.
56
   
However, notwithstanding the numerous constraints with which the 
Supreme Court has encumbered habeas, the current model still maintains 
                                                                                                                         
the probability of getting certiorari granted is very low.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
rules expressly state that the Court rarely grants certiorari to correct an “erroneous 
application of a properly stated rule of law,” id., so state courts that correctly articulate 
the rules of law they are required to apply will rarely have their decisions reconsidered by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Accordingly, only habeas corpus review provides state 
prisoners with a guaranteed opportunity to have a life-tenured federal judge consider their 
federal constitutional claims, and habeas review therefore plays an important role in the 
enforcement of federal constitutional protections for criminal defendants. 
52
 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1973).  Harmless errors, in habeas cases as 
on direct appeal, cannot be the basis for relief.  SIEGEL, supra note 5, at 1059-61. 
53
 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).   
54
 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302 (1989) (confirming the rule of Teague).  A prisoner may seek habeas on the 
basis of developments in substantive constitutional law that occur after the prisoner’s 
conviction becomes final. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 310-11; see also Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 198 (2016) (restating this point).  But the prisoner may not take 
similar advantage of subsequent developments in the constitutional law of criminal 
procedure. 
55
 (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).   
56
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468 U.S. 837 
(1984).  Indeed, if anything, deference under § 2254(d) is stronger than Chevron 
deference.  The Supreme Court has said that habeas relief is appropriate only the state 
court’s decision is so wrong that “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree 
that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” Harrington v. 
Richter, 592 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). 
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the crucial characteristic that habeas is exempt from preclusion.  Habeas 
relief is certainly much less available in 2021 than it was in 1971, but the 
writ still serves as a mechanism by which federal district courts can 
effectively overrule state courts in criminal cases.  They can still provide 
relief that the Supreme Court might have provided on direct review via a 
writ of certiorari.  To be sure, district courts can now do this only in clear-
cut cases.  But while habeas is today is importantly constrained, it is still 
appropriate to refer to the current model of habeas as a “constrained 
certiorari substitute” model. 
 
C.  The Thomas/Gorsuch Model of Habeas 
The habeas model championed by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch 
stands in sharp contrast to the current model outlined above.  As they see 
it, habeas should not provide state prisoners with an opportunity to 
relitigate points of constitutional law already considered in their criminal 
cases.  It should not allow district courts to act as a mini-Supreme Court 
and to provide relief that the Supreme Court could have provided via a 
writ of certiorari.  Habeas should, instead, give preclusive effect to the 
decisions of the sentencing court.  It should guard only against the rare 
case in which the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch set forth their proposed model of habeas 
in concurring opinions in the recent case of Edwards v. Vannoy.
57
  While 
the precise point at issue in Edwards is not of critical importance to the 
main issue discussed in this Article, it is worth considering briefly, 
because, as will be seen below,
58
 Justice Gorsuch’s treatment of the point 
at issue in Edwards helps reveal one of the flaws in his position. 
 
1.  Edwards  
Edwards modified the rule, noted earlier, that a habeas petitioner may 
not take advantage of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure that 
were established only after the prisoner’s original conviction became final 
on direct review.  Edwards rescinded an exception to the rule, thereby 
making the rule more stringent. 
The rule was first announced in a plurality opinion by Justice 
O’Connor in the 1989 case of Teague v. Lane.
59
  The opinion justified the 
rule as an appropriate balance between the prisoner’s interest in life or 
liberty and the state’s interest in the finality of its judgments in criminal 
cases.
60
 States, the opinion noted, were “understandably frustrated” by 
cases in which they conducted a criminal trial in compliance with the 
                                                 
57
 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021). 
58
 See Part III.A, infra. 
59
 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).  The full Court subsequently confirmed the 
rule.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  The Court also applied the rule to capital 
cases, a point Teague had reserved.  See Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2 (reserving the 
question of the application of the anti-retroactivity principle to capital cases); Penry, 492 
U.S. at 314 (applying the principle in a capital case). 
60
 Id. at 309. 
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constitutional requirements laid down by the Supreme Court, only to have 
the judgment vitiated in a subsequent habeas proceeding because the state 
had failed to comply with a rule of criminal procedure announced only 
after the trial had been completed.
61
  Although Justice O’Connor 
concluded that a new rule of criminal procedure announced after a 
defendant’s trial is completed but while the defendant’s case is still 
pending on direct review must be applied to the case,
62
 she said that once 
the defendant’s opportunity for direct review is exhausted, the state’s 
interest in finality outweighs the defendant’s interest in having new rules 
applied to the case in collateral habeas proceedings.
63
 
Nonetheless, as originally conceived, the rule of Teague contemplated 
an exception for certain rare, “watershed” rules of criminal procedure, 
which, even though new, would apply retroactively in habeas 
proceedings.
64
  However, after Teague announced this purported exception 
in 1989, the Supreme Court never found any new rule of criminal 
procedure to fall within it.
65
  Over a period of more than 30 years, the 
Supreme Court announced several important new rules of criminal 
procedure, but never found any of them to be “watershed” rules that would 
apply retroactively in habeas proceedings.
66
  Teague’s exception for 
“watershed” rules, though available in theory, seemed a nullity in practice. 
                                                 
61
 Id. at 310.  The opinion did not, apparently, give weight to the consideration that  
62
 Id. at 304-05.  The opinion justified this conclusion based on two considerations: first, 
a new rule must be applied in the case in which it is announced, for otherwise the 
announcement of the new rule would not be a judicial action, but would instead 
effectively be legislation, id. at 304, and second, the new rule must then be similarly 
applied to all cases pending on direct review because like cases must be treated alike, id. 
at 304-05.   
63
 Id. at 305-10.  The opinion did seem to consider that a defendant might feel 
“understandably frustrated” at having to remain imprisoned (or even, perhaps, be 
executed) even though a new rule announced after the defendant’s conviction became 
final showed that the proceedings had violated the defendant’s federal constitutional 
rights.  Such a defendant might be especially frustrated if the timing were such that, had 
the defendant’s direct appeals proceeded just a little more slowly, the defendant’s case 
would still have been pending on direct review when the new rule was announced, 
thereby entitling the defendant to the benefit of the new rule. 
64
 Id. at 311-12. 
65
 See Edwards, 141 S. Ct. at 1557 (noting that “the Court since Teague has rejected 
every claim that a new procedural rule qualifies as a watershed rule”). 
66
 Teague opined that it was “unlikely that many [‘watershed’] components of basic due 
process have yet to emerge.” Id. at 313. But it was only after Teague that the Court 
decided several criminal procedure cases that were, at a minimum, quite important.  
These cases included Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (holding that the jury 
verdict in a state court trial in a serious criminal case must be unanimous); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause limits the use of hearsay evidence in state criminal cases); and Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that the Constitution does not permit a state court, 
based on facts found only by a judge, to “enhance” a defendant’s sentence beyond the 
statutory maximum sentence for the offense of which a jury found the defendant guilty).  
The Court denied retroactive collateral application to all of these rules.  Edwards, 141 S. 
Ct. at 1557. 
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In Edwards, after denying retroactive application to an important new 
rule yet again,
67
 the Court finally put this supposed exception to Teague’s 
anti-retroactivity principle out of its misery.  It held that new constitutional 
rules of criminal procedure simply do not apply retroactively to habeas 
cases, however significant they might be.
68
   
Although three dissenting Justices took sharp issue with Edwards’ 
elimination of what they regarded as a “critical aspect” of Teague,
69
 and 
although Edwards’s elimination of Teague’s “watershed” exception will 
no doubt engender much commentary,
70
 a sober assessment of this 
development would have to conclude that whatever its theoretical 
significance, it is of little practical importance.  The distinction between 
having an exception that is theoretically available but never applied in 
practice, and having no exception at all, can hardly matter to anyone.  
 
2.  The Concurring Opinions 
What is truly significant about the Edwards case is that Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch used it as the occasion to put forward some 
additional points.  Each joined the other’s opinion.  Each agreed with the 
majority’s disposition of the precise question posed by Edwards, but 
thought that the same result could also have been reached on different 
grounds.   
Justice Thomas argued that the Court might have reached the result by 
applying the text of the 1996 AEDPA.
71
 That argument, whether right or 
wrong, is fairly narrow.  Even if the full Court adopted this argument, it 
would not work any great change in habeas corpus.   
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, by contrast, argued for a wholly different 
model of habeas corpus that would have far-reaching consequences if 
adopted by the full Court.  After agreeing with the Court’s disposition of 
the precise question posed by the Edwards case,
72
 Justice Gorsuch 
                                                 
67
 141 S. Ct. at 1559 (denying retroactive application to the rule of Ramos). 
68
 Id. at 1559-1560. 
69
 Id at 1574 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
70
 See, e.g., Re, supra note 22.  Professor Re’s article focuses on Edwards’s elimination 
of the “watershed” exception to Teague, and while it notes the proposal by Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch for a radical change in habeas corpus, it does not provide a detailed 
rebuttal.  
71
 141 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas observed that, as modified 
by AEDPA, § 2254(d) of the habeas statute prohibits habeas relief “with respect to any 
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States . . . .” This provision, he asserted, clearly prohibits 
habeas relief based on a rule of law announced only after the prisoner’s state court 
conviction became final on direct review.  Apparently, Justice Thomas believed this 
textual argument was so compelling that it required no elaboration, as after quoting the 
statute he provided no additional explanation but simply said that “Congress, through 
AEDPA, has made clear that federal courts cannot provide relief in this case.”  Id. at 
1565. 
72
 Id. at 1566 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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suggested that that disposition was justified by a much broader reason.  
His fundamental argument was that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not 
authorize federal courts to reopen a judgment issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction once it has become final.”
73
  In other words, 
according to Justice Gorsuch, a habeas court is not authorized to 
reconsider whether a sentencing court decided a criminal case correctly, 
but only whether the sentencing court had jurisdiction.   
The traditional office of the writ of habeas corpus, Justice Gorsuch 
argued, was to force the executive (in England, the Crown) to provide 
reasons for a person’s detention.  The writ performed a vital function in 
cases in which a prisoner had been detained extrajudicially—that is, in 
cases in which the executive simply arrested and held someone, without 
even charging the person with a crime.  In cases in which a jailer 
responded to the writ by saying only that the prisoner was detained per 
speciale mandatum domini regis (“by special order of the King”) or 
something similar,
74
 habeas was the mechanism by which the prisoner 
could demand due process.  But in cases in which the response to the writ 
was that the person was in custody because the person was serving a 
sentence imposed by a court following the person’s conviction for a crime, 
“inquiry was usually at an end.”
75
  No further judicial process was needed 
in such a case because “[c]ustody pursuant to a final judgment was proof 
that a defendant had received the process due to him.”
76
 
Justice Gorsuch maintained that the U.S. federal courts, after being 
statutorily authorized to issue habeas writs in 1789, followed the 
traditional, common-law practice of denying relief for a prisoner confined 
pursuant to a final judgment of conviction.  The only exception was for 
cases in which the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant 
or the offense.  Even after Congress empowered federal courts to grant 
habeas relief to prisoners in state custody in 1867, the federal courts were, 
Justice Gorsuch asserted, “powerless” to grant relief to a prisoner “in 




This principle did not “really begin to change,” according to Justice 
Gorsuch, until “the middle of the twentieth century.”
78
  Following a 
“modest” change in Frank v. Mangum,
79
 the real change occurred in 
                                                 
73
 Id. at 1573. 
74
 Per speciale mandatum domini regis was the response given in Darnel’s Case, 3 How. 
St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1627).  Habeas relief was denied in that case.  Habeas did not take its 
modern form until after passage of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679.  SHARPE, supra note 4, 
at 9-19 (1976); see 141 S. Ct. at 1567 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Darnel’s Case). 
75








 237 U.S. 309 (1915).  In that case, the Supreme Court admitted the possibility that the 
atmosphere at a criminal trial could be so dominated by a mob that implementing a guilty 
verdict would deprive the defendant of life or liberty without due process of law.  Id. at 
335.  But the Court affirmed denial of relief in the case before it.  Id. at 345. 
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Brown v. Allen, which “effectively recast habeas as another way for 
federal courts to redress practically any error of federal law they might 
find in state court proceedings.”
80
  As a result, habeas became “little more 
than an ordinary appeal with an extraordinary Latin name”
81
—i.e., it 
became, as the previous section explained, a substitute for U.S. Supreme 
Court review via certiorari, in which a prisoner can get habeas relief based 
on “practically any error of federal law.”
82
   
Justice Gorsuch suggested that Teague’s rule against retroactive 
application of new procedural rules in habeas proceedings, as well as other 
restrictions on habeas, should be understood as attempts to “return[] the 
Great Writ closer to its historic office.”
83
  Denying prisoners the benefit of 
new rules developed after their convictions became final promoted the 
finality of criminal judgments, which the twentieth-century shift in habeas 
had disrupted.  This principle makes sense, Justice Gorsuch argued, “when 
viewed against the backdrop of the traditional rule that old judgments are 
impervious to new challenges.”
84
  Justice Gorsuch concluded that he 
would in the future be guided by the principles set forth in his opinion.
85
 
In sum, Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Thomas) proposed a starkly 
different model of habeas than the model currently in use.  Under Justice 
Gorsuch’s model, habeas would simply not be available to state prisoners 
in custody pursuant to a final court judgment, unless the sentencing court 
lacked jurisdiction.  Barring such a lack of jurisdiction, habeas courts 
would give preclusive effect to the judgments of sentencing courts.  No 
matter how clear an error the sentencing court might have committed, and 
no matter how significant a violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights 
might have resulted, the habeas court would be compelled to deny relief. 
 
II. Habeas and History 
 
 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion is based on two key assertions:  that federal 
courts traditionally refused habeas relief to prisoners in custody pursuant 
to the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and that this 
purported tradition should be followed today.  Each of these assertions is 
open to challenge.  This Part considers the assertion that federal courts 
traditionally refused habeas relief to prisoners in custody pursuant to the 
final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.  While this assertion is 
not exactly false, it is highly misleading.  It fails to capture the nuanced 
reality of traditional habeas practice.  
 As will be shown below, it is true that in early cases federal courts 
often said that they could not award habeas to a prisoner confined 
                                                 
80
 141 S. Ct. at 1568 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
81
 Id. at 1569. 
82
 Id. at 1568. 
83
 Id. at 1570. 
84
 Id. at 1572. 
85
 Id. at 1573. 
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pursuant to a court’s judgment unless the court lacked jurisdiction.  But 
these statements cannot be taken at face value.  These cases used the term 
“jurisdiction” as a term of art with a specialized meaning quite different 
from the meaning it would have today.  Federal courts issued habeas relief 
to prisoners in custody by virtue of courts’ judgments even though the 
courts had what would today be regarded as jurisdiction.   
 Justice Gorsuch’s error lies in imagining that statements made more 
than a century ago can be plucked from their historical context and 
understood as they would be understood if made today.  Indeed, assessing 
Justice Gorsuch’s position provides a useful lesson in the delicacy and 
difficulty that can attend the use of historical materials.  One must always 
remember that “the past is a foreign country; they do things differently 
there.”
86
  Historical statements must be understood in their historical 
context.  Understood in that context, the “traditional” statement that a 
habeas court will not reconsider issues decided by a sentencing court that 
had jurisdiction turns out to have a very different meaning than the same 
words would have if written today. 
The remainder of this Part first shows the kernel of truth in Justice 
Gorsuch’s position and then shows why that position is ultimately 
incorrect or, at least, highly misleading. 
 
A.  The Case for Justice Gorsuch’s Position 
 Justice Gorsuch is by no means the first to assert that habeas relief was 
not traditionally available to prisoners in custody pursuant to the final 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.  Justice Jackson made the 
same claim in his concurring opinion in Brown v. Allen
87
—the case that, 
according to Justice Gorsuch, wrongly made habeas relief available for all 
manner of constitutional errors.  Professor Paul Bator, in an influential 
article cited by both Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch in their opinions 
in Edwards,
88
 asserted that it was a “black-letter principle of the common 
law that the writ was simply not available at all to one convicted of crime 
by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
89
 Indeed, Professor Bator claimed 
that as late as 1949 the federal courts’ understanding of their habeas power 




 Moreover, it is true that in early habeas cases, federal courts often said 
that a habeas court could not reconsider questions already decided by the 
sentencing court, but could inquire only whether the sentencing court had 
jurisdiction.  Prior to 1867, when Congress had not yet empowered the 
federal courts to grant habeas relief to state prisoners, federal habeas 
courts made this statement in cases involving federal prisoners.  After 
                                                 
86
 L. P. HARTLEY, THE GO BETWEEN 9 (1953). 
87
 343 U.S. 443, 33 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result). 
88
 See 141 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1571 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
89
 Bator, supra note 30, at 466. 
90
 Id. at 465. 
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Congress extended the writ to state prisoners in 1867, federal habeas 
courts made the same statement in cases involving state prisoners. 
Justice Gorsuch relied, for example, on the early case of Ex parte 
Watkins, in which the Supreme Court refused habeas relief sought by a 
prisoner in federal custody following conviction for federal crimes.  In an 
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court said that “[t]he judgment of a 
court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world 
as the judgment of this court would be.”
91
  The Court refused to review the 
prisoner’s claim that his indictment did not charge a crime under federal 
law, because even if the sentencing court’s decision on that question had 
been erroneous, it was not a nullity.
92
  The Court distinguished Wise v. 
Withers,
93
 a case in which it permitted a collateral attack on the judgment 
of a court martial, on the ground that the court marital lacked jurisdiction 
over a person not belonging to the militia.
94
 
 Similar statements can be found in cases involving state prisoners after 
1867.  For example, in Felts v. Murphy,
95
 the prisoner had been convicted 
of murder in state court.  He contended that he had been unable to hear the 
proceedings because of deafness and that the state court’s failure to take 
appropriate measures to accommodate his hearing problems deprived him 
of liberty without due process of law.  In affirming denial of habeas relief, 
the Supreme Court said, “upon this writ the question for our determination 
is simply one of jurisdiction.  If that were not lacking at the time of the 
trial, and if it continued all through, then the application for the writ was 
properly denied by the circuit court, and its order must be affirmed.  The 
writ cannot perform the function of a writ of error.”
96
 
 Thus, Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion that federal courts traditionally 
issued habeas relief to a prisoner in custody following a criminal 
conviction only if the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction is certainly not 
without any basis.  Federal courts recited that principle in numerous early 
cases and repeated it into the twentieth century.
97
  Professor Bator also 
used it as the centerpiece of his academic examination of habeas.
98
 
                                                 
91
 Id. at 202-03. 
92
 Id. at 202. 
93
 7 U.S. 331 (1830). 
94
 28 U.S. at 209.  Numerous other cases in which a prisoner in federal custody sought 
habeas relief stated that relief could be granted only if the sentencing court lacked 
jurisdiction.  E.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 3 (1887) (“[T]his court . . . can have no 
right to issue this writ as a means of reviewing the judgment of the circuit court simply 
upon the ground of error in its proceedings; but if it shall appear that the court had no 
jurisdiction to render the judgment which it gave, and under which the petitioner is held a 
prisoner, it is within the power and it will be the duty of this court to order his 
discharge.”). 
95
 201 U.S. 123 (1906). 
96
 Id. at 129. 
97
 E.g., Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123 (1906). 
98
 Bator, supra note 30.  Another leading academic examination of the early habeas cases 
is Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. Civ. Rights – 
Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 579 (1982).  Professor Peller maintained that early cases such as 
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B.  The Error in Justice Gorsuch’s Position 
Justice Gorsuch’s assertion is, however, extremely misleading.  As 
suggested earlier, statements by nineteenth century habeas courts that they 
would inquire only into the “jurisdiction” of a sentencing court must be 
understood in their historical context.  That context imbues these 
statements with a very different meaning.  For at the same time as 
nineteenth century federal courts were ostensibly disclaiming the authority 
to issue habeas relief to a prisoner in custody pursuant to the final 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, these same federal courts 
were, in fact, issuing habeas relief to prisoners convicted of crimes in 
courts that had what today would certainly be called jurisdiction.   
This paradox is resolved by recognizing that in these early cases, the 
habeas courts used the term “jurisdiction” as a specialized term of art.  
Today, the statement that a habeas court could inquire only whether the 
sentencing court had jurisdiction calls to mind cases such as Wise v. 
Withers, noted above, in which a court martial was held to lack 
jurisdiction to entertain a prosecution of a civilian.
99
  In fact, however, in 
cases decided during the “traditional” period upon which Justice Gorsuch 
relies, the inquiry into the “jurisdiction” of the sentencing court had a 
completely different meaning.  A habeas court would claim to be 
examining only whether a sentencing court had jurisdiction, but it would 
find such jurisdiction to be lacking if the sentencing court’s proceedings 
suffered from defects that one would today characterize as non-
jurisdictional.  The sentencing court would be found to lack jurisdiction if 
it had committed certain important errors unrelated to what would today 
be regarded as the court’s jurisdiction.  The term “jurisdiction” must be 
understood in this historical context. 
For example, numerous cases demonstrate that if a prisoner were 
convicted pursuant to a substantively unconstitutional law, the sentencing 
court would be said to lack jurisdiction, with the result that a federal court 
could grant habeas relief.  In Ex parte Siebold, for example, the prisoners 
were in federal custody, having been convicted in federal court of federal 
crimes under federal election law.
100
  They sought habeas on the ground 
that the law under which they were convicted was unconstitutional.
101
  
                                                                                                                         
Watkins did not reflect a limit on habeas generally, but rather a limit that applied only to 
the Supreme Court specifically.  Congress had not granted the Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction in criminal cases, and the Court believed it was inappropriate to use the 
habeas writ to vitiate criminal judgments over which it had no appellate power.  Id. at 
611-15.  In their exhaustive treatise, Professors Randy Hertz and James S. Liebman 
maintain that neither Bator nor Peller accurately describe early habeas practice.  They 
maintain that habeas served as a limited substitute for appeal as of right and that the 
availability of habeas depended inversely on the availability of direct review in the 
Supreme Court.   1 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 26, at 45 & n.71.   
99
 See notes 93-94 and accompanying text, supra; see also note 24 and accompanying 
text, supra. 
100
 100 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1879). 
101
 Id. 
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Although the Supreme Court ultimately denied relief,
102
 it held that the 
question raised was “proper for consideration on habeas corpus.”
103
 The 
Court explained that “[a]n unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.  
An offence created by it is not a crime.  A conviction under it is not 
merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of 
imprisonment.”
104
  Accordingly, the Court said, a court trying a case under 
an unconstitutional law “acquire[s] no jurisdiction.”
105
  
 Siebold illuminates what a nineteenth-century habeas court meant 
when it said that it could inquire only whether a sentencing court had 
jurisdiction.  Siebold reconciled that statement with the assertion of 
authority to grant habeas relief to a prisoner convicted under an 
unconstitutional statute by holding that a court conducting a criminal case 
under an unconstitutional statute necessarily lacks jurisdiction.  
Technically, these statements are consistent.  But it is obvious that this 
consistency has been achieved only by use of a legal fiction.
106
   
The suggestion that a sentencing court loses jurisdiction because of a 
constitutional defect in the statute creating the crime being tried is not 
true.  It is a fiction.  Like all legal fictions, it a statement known to be 
false, but made and treated as though it were true in order “to reconcile a 
specific legal result with some premise or postulate.”
107
  Here, the 
“premise or postulate” is that a habeas court can issue relief to a prisoner 
in custody by virtue of a final judgment of conviction only if the 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction.  Rather than soften that postulate, the 
courts introduced the fiction that if a prisoner was convicted under an 
unconstitutional statute, then the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. 
Of course, this is not really true.  A federal court trying a criminal case 
does not acquire jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the statute creating 
the crime being tried.  That jurisdiction comes not from a substantive 
criminal statute, but from a statute that gives federal courts jurisdiction 
over federal criminal cases generally, currently, 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
108
  This 
was as true at the time of Siebold as it is today.  At the time of Siebold, § 
563 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provided, “[t]he district 
courts shall have jurisdiction . . . [o]f all crimes and offenses cognizable 
under the authority of the United States . . . .”  Section 629 provided that 
“[t]he circuit courts shall have . . . [e]xclusive cognizance of all crimes and 
offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where 
                                                 
102
 Id. at 399. 
103
 Id. at 376. 
104
 Id. at 376-77. 
105
 Id. at 377.  Siebold involved a prisoner convicted of a crime in federal court, but other 
cases approved similar relief for prisoners in state custody who had been convicted of 
crimes in state court.   
106
 See Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions (pts. 1-3), 25 Ill. L. Rev. 363, 513, 877 (1930-1931). I 
107
 Id. at 363-72, 514. 
108
 That statute provides, “The district courts of the United States shall have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the 
United States.” 
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it is or may be otherwise provided by law, and concurrent jurisdiction with 
the district courts of crimes and offenses cognizable therein.”   
 These undoubtedly constitutional provisions gave the circuit court that 
tried and sentenced the prisoners in Siebold jurisdiction over the criminal 
case against them.  The alleged constitutional infirmity in the statutes 
creating the substantive crimes for which they were tried (§§ 5515 and 
5522 of the Revised Statutes) could not take away that jurisdiction.  
Certainly no one today would suggest that if a defendant is criminally 
prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute, the unconstitutionality of the 
substantive criminal statute deprives the court of jurisdiction.
109
   
 Siebold, as noted above, concerned prisoners in federal custody, but 
numerous cases make clear that the same principle applied to cases 
involving prisoners in state custody following conviction of crimes.  A 
federal court could issue habeas relief to such a prisoner if it determined 
that the statute under which the prisoner was convicted was substantively 
unconstitutional.
110
 In some of these cases the habeas court did not even 
bother to say that the unconstitutionality of the statute under which the 
prisoner was convicted deprived the sentencing court of jurisdiction; it 
simply issued habeas relief.
111
 
 Thus, the frequently repeated statement that a habeas court considering 
the case of a prisoner held pursuant to a judgment of conviction could 
inquire only whether the sentencing court had jurisdiction must be 
understood in a special sense.  When understood in its original context, 
with due consideration given to the legal fiction that determined whether 
the sentencing court had “jurisdiction,” one can see that the habeas court 
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was not really limited to inquiring into what today we would call the 
sentencing court’s jurisdiction. The habeas court could also inquire 
whether the sentencing court’s proceedings suffered from a defect that, for 
habeas purposes, was fictionally deemed to be jurisdictional, even though 
it really had nothing to do with jurisdiction.   
It is therefore a serious error to wrench, from its original context, the 
statement that the habeas court could inquire only into the sentencing 
court’s jurisdiction.  The statement does not mean what the same words 
would mean if a court wrote them today.  The statement must be 
understood in its historical context. 
 Moreover, further examination of that historical context shows that the 
set of defects that were fictionally deemed jurisdictional for habeas 
purposes was not limited to substantive constitutional defects in the statute 
under which a defendant was prosecuted.  Habeas courts also determined 
that sentencing courts lost jurisdiction on the basis of defects in a 
prisoner’s sentence, particularly where the defect was a violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Habeas relief was approved in cases in which 
the prisoner had been subjected to two sentences for a single offense.
112
 
 Thus, for example, in Ex parte Lange, the prisoner was incorrectly 
sentenced to two punishments (a fine and a term of imprisonment) for a 
single offense, fulfilled one of them (the fine), and sought habeas relief 
from the other (the term of imprisonment).  The sentencing court then 
purported to resentence the prisoner to a single punishment of 
imprisonment.
113
  The Supreme Court, however, held that once the 
prisoner “had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to which 
alone the law subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was 
gone.”
114
  Accordingly, the Court held, the sentence “was pronounced 
without authority,” and habeas relief could be granted.
115
  Similarly, in Ex 
parte Nielsen,
116
 in which the prisoner also sought habeas relief on double 
jeopardy grounds, the Court acknowledged the rule that a “regular” 
judgment of conviction cannot be question collaterally, but it said that 
“[i]n the present case the sentence given was beyond the jurisdiction of the 
court, because it was against an express provision of the constitution 
which bounds and limits all jurisdiction.”
117
  The Court ordered habeas 
relief.
118
    
Again, in both of these cases it seems clear that the sentencing court 
had what today we would regard as jurisdiction, and that the Supreme 
Court’s suggestion that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction was a legal 
fiction.  Indeed, in Nielsen, the Court, commenting on its prior decision in 
Lange, said that in that case, “the court had authority to hear and 
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determine the case, but we held that it had no authority to give the 
judgment it did,”
119
 which seems very close to saying “the sentencing 
court had jurisdiction over the case, but we are going to treat it as though it 
lacked jurisdiction.” 
 Professor Bator, to his credit, recognized that courts traditionally made 
exceptions to what he called the “strict jurisdictional test” for cases where 
the underlying criminal statute was unconstitutional and for cases 
involving double jeopardy.  He even acknowledged that these exceptions 
are “not . . . easily justified today.”
120
  He maintained, however, that they 
were not legal fictions, and that when “viewed in a historical context they 
are not completely unintelligible.”
121
  According to Bator, in the era in 
which these cases were decided, courts regarded unconstitutional statutes 
as “void” and believed “they created no law at all,” and that therefore “a 
judgment under such a statute, too, has a nonexistent quality.”  As to the 
exception for defects in the sentence, Bator explained it on the ground that 
a sentence was not regarded as a “judgment” in the same sense as a 
judgment of conviction.
122
  Bator cautioned against viewing these 
exceptions as legal fictions that could be expanded and used to justify 
habeas relief whenever a modern court felt relief would be appropriate.  
Other scholars have, however, long regarded the Supreme Court’s 
assertions from this era as fictions.
123
 
 In addition, although Bator recognized the two exceptions stated 
above, those exceptions did not by any means exhaust the situations in 
which a nineteenth-century habeas court might grant relief even though 
the sentencing court had what we would today regard as jurisdiction.  
There were other such situations, which Bator does not attempt to explain. 
A nineteenth-century habeas court might also hold that a sentencing court 
lacked “jurisdiction” and that habeas relief could be awarded because 
there was a constitutional defect in the procedure by which the sentencing 
court tried the prisoner.   
For example, in Callan v. Wilson,
124
 the prisoner was convicted of a 
crime in a court of the District of Columbia, but the trial had been by the 
court, not by a jury.  The Supreme Court granted habeas relief because the 
trial violated the prisoner’s right to trial by jury.
125
  As a formal matter, it 
appears that the Court determined that the denial of the prisoner’s right to 
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 E.g., Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L.S.J. Human 
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trial by jury left the sentencing court “without jurisdiction” to try him,
126
 
but the Court’s opinion was focused on the jury trial issue, not on 
“jurisdiction.”  Certainly, today, a denial of the right to trial by jury, even 
if it led to reversal of a conviction, would not usually be thought to 
deprive a court of jurisdiction over a criminal case.
127
   
 Similarly, nineteenth century cases allowed habeas relief where the 
trial proceedings violated the prisoner’s right to a grand jury indictment.  
In Ex parte Bain,
128
 for example, the sentencing court permitted an 
amendment of the indictment after the grand jury had issued it, and did not 
require resubmission of the indictment to the grand jury.  The Supreme 
Court granted habeas relief.
129
  Again, as a formal matter, the Court said 
that because of the flaw in the indictment, “jurisdiction of the offense is 
gone.”
130
  But again, if the case were a modern one, a defect in the 
indictment would not usually be regarded as depriving the sentencing 
court of jurisdiction.
131
   
 The above examples show that notwithstanding the frequent statement 
that habeas relief could be granted only for want of “jurisdiction” in the 
sentencing court, the set of errors for which habeas relief might in fact be 
granted is not easily rationalized, or even characterized.  Professor Bator’s 
suggestion that there were only two exceptions to the “strict jurisdictional 
rule” and that these exceptions could be regarded as sincere, not fictional, 
is off the mark.  Indeed, dicta in some cases suggested that the scope of 
errors that could cause the sentencing court to be deemed to have lost its 
jurisdiction was broad indeed.  For example, in In re Bonner, the Court 
said: 
 
[A] court has jurisdiction to render a particular judgment 
only when the offense charged is within the class of 
offenses placed by the law under its jurisdiction, and when, 
in taking custody of the accused, and in its modes of 
procedure to the determination of the question of his guilt 
                                                 
126
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or innocence, and in rendering judgment, the court keeps 
within the limitations prescribed by the law, customary or 
statutory. When the court goes out of these limitations, its 
action, to the extent of such excess, is void. Proceeding 





This statement suggests something akin to the modern rule permitting 
habeas relief whenever the sentencing court violated the prisoner’s 
constitutional rights.
133
   
 In light of the cases described above, it is clear that Justice Gorsuch’s 
flat statement that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not authorize federal 
courts to reopen a judgment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction 
once it has become final”
134
 is at best misleading and at worst simply 
untrue.  If traditional, nineteenth-century habeas practice is the touchstone, 
then one can say that a habeas court is limited to inquiring whether a 
sentencing court had jurisdiction only if the term “jurisdiction” is 
understood as a complex term of art that encompasses numerous 
considerations that are in reality nonjurisdictional.  The statements upon 
which Justice Gorsuch relies cannot be ripped from their historical 
context.  They had a very different meaning when made than they would if 
made today.    
 To be sure, it is conceivable that, in suggesting that Justice Gorsuch 
has ripped the statements upon which he relies from their historical 
context, this Article is doing him an injustice.  Perhaps Justice Gorsuch, if 
confronted with this Article, would declare that he is, of course, using the 
term “a court of competent jurisdiction” in its nineteenth-century sense.  
Perhaps he means that term to encompass all the nonjurisdictional 
considerations (as we would call them today) with which courts imbued it 
in the nineteenth-century cases discussed above.  Such usage would 
reconcile Justice Gorsuch’s position with actual historical practices. 
 But two difficulties lie in the way of such reconciliation.  First, if 
Justice Gorsuch meant that a habeas court’s inquiry into a sentencing 
court’s jurisdiction should follow all the nuances and fictions with which 
this inquiry was actually conducted in the nineteenth century, he should 
have said so clearly and expressly.  But he didn’t.  The portion of his 
opinion in which he set forth his basic claim about the “traditional” rule 
makes no mention of these fictions at all.  It simply asserts flatly that “a 
federal court was powerless to revisit [a state sentencing court’s] 
proceedings unless the state court had acted without jurisdiction.”
135
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Surely, Justice Gorsuch must understand what this statement sounds 
like to modern lawyers.  He must know that most of his readers will be 
unfamiliar with the way federal courts handled habeas cases in the 
nineteenth century—even those who are familiar with habeas at all will 
presumably be focused on how it works today, not on how it worked more 
than a century ago.  So Justice Gorsuch must know that the concept of 
“jurisdiction” in his statement is likely to be understood as it is used today, 
not as it was used in the nineteenth century.   
In addition, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion does contain a brief reference, 
hidden in a footnote, to the nuances of the nineteenth century inquiry into 
a sentencing court’s jurisdiction, and in that reference, he declines to 
embrace those nuances fully.
136
  In the footnote, Justice Gorsuch observes 
that the plurality opinion in Teague provided that federal habeas courts 
could give retroactive application to new rules of substantive 
constitutional law announced after a prisoner’s criminal conviction 
becomes final on direct review.  Citing Ex parte Siebold, Justice Gorsuch 
allowed that this principle from Teague could be justified based on its 
“resemblance to this Court’s early cases finding a lack of jurisdiction over 
a defendant or an offense.”
137
 
 Even in this footnote, however, Justice Gorsuch does not commit to 
applying the tradition of regarding a criminal proceeding under an 
unconstitutional statute as one in which the sentencing court lacks 
“jurisdiction” and as to which habeas relief may issue.  He says that 
“perhaps” such a case would come within the “jurisdictional exception to 
the finality rule,” but also “perhaps not.”
138
  And if Justice Gorsuch is not 
necessarily willing to accept that a sentencing court lacked “jurisdiction” 
in a case in which the defendant was prosecuted under a substantively 
unconstitutional statute, then it would likely follow a fortiori that he would 
not regard “jurisdiction” as being lacking if the sentencing court’s error 
were procedural, even if the error was considered “jurisdictional” in the 
coded sense of the term used in nineteenth-century cases. 
 So it seems unlikely that when Justice Gorsuch says that habeas relief 
cannot be granted in cases where a prisoner is in custody pursuant to the 
final judgment of a court of “competent jurisdiction,” he is at the same 
time winking to indicate that the term “jurisdiction” should be understood 
in its nuanced, fictional, nineteenth-century sense.  And if he is, his 
opinion is simply all the more misleading.  If he meant that, he should 
have said so clearly. 
   In sum, Justice Gorsuch, like Justice Jackson before him, relies too 
casually on a supposed tradition that a habeas court cannot question a final 
judgment of criminal conviction unless the sentencing court that issued 
that judgment lacked jurisdiction.  Yes, that statement can be found in 
many nineteenth-century opinions.  But the statement must be understood 
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in the historical context in which it was made.  That context shows that the 
statement was subject to many exceptions based on the fiction that the 
sentencing court lacked jurisdiction in situations in which it had violated 
the prisoner’s constitutional rights—so many, in fact, that the distance 
between nineteenth century habeas practices and those approved in Brown 





III.  Habeas and Hermeneutics 
 
 The previous Part suggested that Justice Gorsuch’s account of when 
habeas relief was traditionally available fails to consider the numerous 
circumstances in which a nineteenth-century habeas court could determine 
that a sentencing court lacked “jurisdiction.”  But even if this part of 
Justice Gorsuch’s argument were accepted, his assertion that federal courts 
today should follow what he regards as the “traditional” rule would fail for 
a different reason.  The reason is that Congress has displaced the allegedly 
traditional rule by statute.  Exploring this point provides a lesson in the 
hermeneutics of statutory interpretation, namely, that a court interpreting a 
statute must consider not only what the statute expressly states, but what 
its provisions necessarily imply.  This kind of hermeneutical analysis is 
distinct from intentionalist analysis or reliance on legislative history.  
Justice Gorsuch regards himself very much as a textualist, and he would 
scoff at efforts to show that Congress “intended” habeas relief to be 
available in certain situations, especially if based on extrinsic materials 
such as legislative history.
140
   But even a textualist (indeed, perhaps, 
especially a textualist) must give due weight to matters that are implied, 
even if not expressly stated, by statutory text. 
The 1867 habeas statute empowered federal courts to grant habeas 
relief “in all cases where any person may be restrained of his life or liberty 
in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United 
States.”
141
 Nearly identical words remain in the statute today.
142
 This 
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language might, by itself, be interpreted to authorize habeas relief in cases 
in which a sentencing court’s judgment is infected by constitutional 
error.
143
  But even if it were not, such a rule is implicit in Congress’s 
subsequent amendments to the habeas statute.  
 Congress significantly amended the habeas statute in 1966 and 
1996.
144
  But as early as 1953, all agree, Brown v. Allen had made clear 
that habeas relief may be granted on the basis of any constitutional error 
by the sentencing court.
145
  The 1966 and 1996 amendments do nothing to 
rescind the rule of Brown v. Allen, which would normally lead to the 
conclusion that Congress had adopted it.
146
  Moreover, the 1996 
amendments added language that assumes the ability of federal habeas 
courts to grant relief in cases other than those where the sentencing court 
lacked jurisdiction.   
Justice Gorsuch’s failure to acknowledge the significance of this 
language is akin to an argument he made in Edwards. This Part first 
examines Justice Gorsuch’s curious argument and then considers how it is 
related to the correct understanding of the 1996 habeas amendments. 
 
A.  Justice Gorsuch’s Curious Argument  
Whatever one thinks of Justice Gorsuch’s main argument in Edwards, 
one part of his opinion seems rather curious.  He suggests that the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to find any rules to fall within the supposed 
“watershed” exception to the anti-retroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane 
“only begins to make sense” against the backdrop of the supposedly 
traditional rule that habeas courts cannot reopen final judgments of courts 
of competent jurisdiction.
147
  But this rule, if it were accepted, would 
make the anti-retroactivity principle of Teague bewildering, not sensible. 
As noted earlier, Teague held that prisoners seeking habeas relief are 
normally not entitled to the benefit of “new rules” of criminal procedure, 
but it left open a possible exception for “watershed” rules.
148
  Teague 
justified its anti-retroactivity principle as a balancing between the 
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prisoner’s interest in life or liberty and the state’s interest in the finality of 
its judgments.
149
   
Justice Gorsuch suggests that the Supreme Court’s refusal ever to find 
that a new rule of criminal procedure fell within Teague’s “watershed” 
exception makes sense for a quite different reason, namely, the supposedly 
traditional rule that habeas courts cannot reopen a final judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction.  But if the Supreme Court were to adopt 
this purportedly traditional rule, that would not justify refusing to make 
exceptions to the anti-retroactivity principle of Teague.  It would render 
the entire regime of Teague superfluous.  If a habeas court were limited to 
inquiring whether a sentencing court had jurisdiction, it is certainly true 
that the habeas court could not grant habeas relief based on retroactive 
application of a new rule of criminal procedure.  But it also could not 
grant habeas relief based on prospective application of a new rule of 
criminal procedure.  Rules of criminal procedure would not matter at all in 
habeas proceedings if the habeas court could only inquire whether the 
sentencing court had jurisdiction. 
Thus, the rule of Teague makes sense only as part of a larger regime 
within which habeas courts can grant relief based on the failure of 
sentencing courts to follow constitutional rules of criminal procedure.  If 
the supposedly traditional principle for which Justice Gorsuch argues in 
Edwards were ever adopted, it would not justify stringent application of 
Teague’s anti-retroactivity principle and the concomitant elimination of 
exceptions to that principle.  It would overwhelm the entire regime within 





B.  The Habeas Statute and the 1996 Amendments 
A similar point applies to the proper interpretation of the habeas 
statute in light of Congress’s amendments to the statute.  Not only do the 
1966 and 1996 amendments fail to rebuff what were by then the Supreme 
Court’s clear holdings that federal habeas courts could grant relief for 
constitutional errors by sentencing courts, but the 1996 amendments added 
language that makes sense only on the assumption that such relief is 
possible.   
The main thrust of the 1996 AEDPA amendments was to limit the 
availability of habeas relief. AEDPA imposed several restrictions on 
habeas relief for state prisoners.  But even as it did so, it unmistakably 




 Perhaps Justice Gorsuch is suggesting that refusal to permit exceptions to Teague’s 
anti-retroactivity principle makes sense in light of his putatively traditional habeas rule 
because both lead to the result of denying relief.  But just because two rules lead to the 
same result does not mean that one makes sense in light of the other.  The rule of Teague 
does not look sensible in light of Justice Gorsuch’s purportedly traditional rule; it looks 
strangely underinclusive.  The rule “deny relief if the prisoner’s name starts with a 
vowel” would also lead to the same result as the supposedly traditional rule, but it would 
not “begin to make sense” in light of that rule.  It would be as puzzling as it obviously is. 
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assumed the availability of habeas relief based on constitutional errors in a 
state sentencing court’s proceedings. 
Section 104 of AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C § 2254(d) to provide: 
 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 
unless the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
  
This provision importantly narrowed the availability of habeas relief 
for state prisoners.  As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this is the 
provision that requires federal habeas courts to give deference to legal 
rulings by state sentencing courts.
151
  The amended § 2254(d), thus 
construed, departs from the principle that federal habeas courts may grant 
relief whenever the Supreme Court might have vacated a prisoner’s 
conviction on direct review. 
However, the significance of § 2254(d) for present purposes is that it 
necessarily assumes that a federal habeas court may review the legal 
rulings of the state sentencing court.  As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
§ 2254(d) provides that a federal habeas court may not grant habeas relief 
unless a ruling by the state sentencing court on a federal constitutional 
issue was clearly wrong under Supreme Court precedent.  But the very 
articulation of this standard presupposes that the federal habeas court may 
at least consider the state sentencing court’s rulings under that standard.  
If, as Justice Gorsuch suggests, the federal habeas court’s consideration is 
limited to determining whether the sentencing court had jurisdiction, then 
section 2254(d) would be pointless.  The habeas court could not grant 
relief even if the sentencing court’s decision were contrary to clearly 
established federal law. 
Congress could have no occasion to set forth a standard of review for a 
form of review that does not exist.  The clear implication of § 2254(d) is 
that federal habeas courts may grant habeas relief in cases other than those 
in which the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction.
152
  If habeas courts were 
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limited to inquiring whether sentencing courts had jurisdiction, the 
provisions of § 2254(d) would be superfluous. 
AEDPA’s assumption that a federal habeas court may reconsider 
issues decided by a state sentencing court, even if the sentencing court had 
jurisdiction, is also clear in AEDPA’s provisions establishing “special 
habeas corpus procedures in capital cases.”
153
  These provisions are 
probably unfamiliar to most readers (even readers who are knowledgeable 
about the main habeas provisions such as 28 U.S.C. § 2254), as they have 
not seen much use.  They apply only in a state that has “opted-in” to them 
and as to which the Attorney General has certified that the state has 
established a mechanism for providing counsel in postconviction 
proceedings,
154
 and for more than 20 years after AEDPA was passed, no 
state had been so certified.
155
  Nonetheless, the provisions’ implications 
for the powers of a federal habeas court are highly instructive. 
After providing that a habeas petition from a prisoner in state custody 
who is subject to a capital sentence must be filed within a shortened time 
limit,
156
 the statute provides: 
 
(a) Whenever a State prisoner under capital sentence 
files a petition for habeas corpus relief to which this chapter 
applies, the district court shall only consider a claim or 
claims that have been raised and decided on the merits in 
the State courts, unless the failure to raise the claim 
properly is— 
(1) the result of State action in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States; 
(2) the result of the Supreme Court's recognition of a 
new Federal right that is made retroactively applicable; or 
(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have 
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence in 
time to present the claim for State or Federal post-
conviction review. 
(b) Following review subject to subsections (a), (d), and 




                                                                                                                         
that a federal habeas court need not give deference to the state sentencing court’s rulings.  
Id.  The Supreme Court ultimately rejected that argument, but § 2254(d)’s implication 
that a federal habeas court can conduct some form of review of the state sentencing 
court’s determinations seems inescapable. 
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Thus, the statute provides that (subject to stated exceptions) the federal 
habeas court “shall only consider a claim or claims that have been raised 
and decided on the merits in the State courts.”  The statute requires the 
habeas court to consider such claims and to subject them to the standard of 
review provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which, as noted earlier, allows 
habeas relief only if the state sentencing court’s ruling on a constitutional 
issue was clearly and unreasonably incorrect.
158
  Such consideration could 
not occur if a federal habeas court could not reconsider any issue decided 
by a sentencing court of competent jurisdiction.  The command of § 
2264(a) would be meaningless if habeas courts were so limited.   
Section 2264 necessarily assumes that federal habeas courts have the 
power to reconsider issues decided by state sentencing courts.  To be sure, 
it provides that such reconsideration will take place under a very lenient 
standard of review that will typically result in denial of relief, but that is 
very different from having no review at all.  A legislature that 
contemplated application of what Justice Gorsuch asserts to be the 
traditional rule (that a habeas court cannot provide any relief to a prisoner 
in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction) would never have enacted § 2264.  That section necessarily 
implies that federal habeas courts have more power than they would have 
under the putatively “traditional” rule advocated by Justice Gorsuch. 
Thus, the text of the habeas statute necessarily implies, even if it does 
not expressly state, that federal habeas courts may award habeas relief to a 
prisoner in custody by virtue of the final judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Of course, as noted earlier, there are also important policy 
reasons why this should be true.
159
  But even those who, in the name of 
textualism, might be inclined to disregard such policy considerations must 
give effect to the statutory text, including both what the text states and 




 Exploration of the concurring opinions by Justice Thomas and Justice 
Gorsuch in Edwards is valuable both because of the great importance of 
the scope of the federal habeas power and because of the larger historical 
and hermeneutical lessons involved.  The historical lesson is that historical 
materials must be understood in historical context.  The hermeneutical 
lesson is that statutory text must be read in light of both what it says and 
what it fairly implies. 
  Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch are doubly mistaken to suggest 
that federal courts should follow a supposedly traditional rule under which 
a federal habeas court cannot award relief to a state prisoner in custody 
pursuant to a final court judgment unless the sentencing court lacked 
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jurisdiction.  The language in early habeas cases that they claim supports 
this supposed rule must be understood in its historical context.  Properly 
understood, the early cases establish no such rule, but instead show that 
habeas courts were traditionally able to award relief for a broad range of 
constitutional errors by sentencing courts.   
Moreover, even if there were a traditional rule along the lines that 
Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch suggest, Congress has displaced that 
rule by statute.  The 1996 AEDPA amendments necessarily presuppose a 
broader scope of habeas relief than contemplated by Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch.  The text of the habeas statute as it exists today, when read in 
light of both what it says and what it necessarily implies, shows that the 
supposedly traditional rule, if it ever existed, has been statutorily 
displaced.  
